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Abstract 
This  paper  investigates  how  the  score  and  non-score  components  of  the  newly 
introduced Contextual Value Added (CVA) indicator of school quality affect house 
prices  in  the  catchment area  of  primary  and  secondary  schools  in  England.  The 
empirical analysis, based on data drawn from UK data sources, shows that the score 
component of CVA is positively associated with house prices at both primary and 
secondary  levels  of  education;  while  its  non-score  component  has  a  negative 
significant association with house prices in the analysis of secondary school data, 
but no significant association in the corresponding analysis of primary school data. 
Furthermore,  the  willingness  of  households  to  pay  more  for  a  high  quality 
secondary education appears to depend entirely on the final score and is influenced 
by school comparison within (rather than between) Local Authorities. For primary 
schools, however, the non-score component of CVA also adds to house prices. This 
appears  to  be  more  so  between  Local  Authorities,  highlighting  the  ‘public  good’ 
nature of this school quality indicator.  
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This paper investigates how the score and non-score components of the newly introduced 
Contextual Value Added (CVA) indicator of school quality is associated with house prices 
in the catchment area of primary and secondary schools in England. The score component 
includes the pupils’ final academic achievement, while the non-score component includes 
prior academic achievement and several pupil-specific characteristics generally thought to 
affect  schooling  performance  (age,  language,  special  needs,  ethnicity,  income  etc). 
Breaking down the relationship between CVA and house prices to show separately the 
effect of score and non-score components is important because these two components 
can: (i) affect house prices in opposite direction, thereby obscuring the overall effect of 
CVA; and (ii) convey information about private and social preferences that have distinct 
policy implications. This study is the first to explore the relationship between house prices 
and CVA. Furthermore, it investigates this relationship  at both primary and secondary 
education level and applies semi-parametric analysis - in addition to the usual parametric 
estimation.  The  dataset  used  cover  regions  throughout  England  during  2008  and  is 
constructed by combining information drawn from three independent data sources.  
The capitalization of state school quality to house prices has been the object of a large 
body  of  literature,  especially  in  the  US  (e.g.  Brasington,  2000,  2002;  Haurin  and 
Brasington, 2006, 2009; Black, 1999; Barrow, 2002; Barrow and Rouse, 2004; Downes and 
Zabel, 2002; Clapp et al, 2008; Kane et al, 2006). In the UK the issue has received less 
attention, with only a small number of studies available to date (Gibbons and Machin, 
2003, 2006, 2008; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004; Rosenthal, 2003; Leech and Campos, 
2003); this probably because the locality of individual households is not available in the 
UK data due to confidentiality.  
Using a hedonic approach (Rosen, 1974) most authors estimate house prices as a function 
of measures reflecting the quality of the school which the occupants of the house have 
access to, along with other house attributes such as the number of rooms, size and type. 
Although various measures are used to capture school quality - including expenditure per 
pupil (Downes and Zabel, 2002) and pupil/teacher ratio (Brasington, 1999) – reading 
scores,  proficiency  test  scores  and  other  measures  emphasising  final  academic 
achievement are the most commonly employed (Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2008; Haurin 
and Brasington, 2006; Black, 1999; Rosenthal, 2003). These measures are consistently 2 
 
found to be capitalized into house prices, indicating the willingness of consumers to pay 
for better quality education, a point some studies also try to justify on theoretical grounds 
using a Tiebout-type approach (e.g. Barrow, 2002; Hoxby, 2000).  
Following  Black  (1999),  investigators  have  become  particularly  concerned  about  non-
school factors contaminating the relationship between house prices and school outcomes 
measured  by  test  score  indicators.  For  example,  ignoring  neighbourhood  deprivation 
characteristics (such as crime, poverty and unemployment) can exaggerate the positive 
relationship  between  house  prices  and  high  school  scores.  Local  authority  policies 
(property  taxation,  provision  of  public  goods  etc)  can  also  interfere  with  the  same 
relationship - Black, 1999). This concern about over-emphasising the importance of test 
score  indicators  on  house  prices  echoes  criticism  by  education  economists  that  these 
indicators are inappropriate measures of school quality because they reflect not only on 
school attributes but also on individual and family characteristics and other exogenous 
variables, including the socioeconomic background of the pupil. A measure capturing the 
distinct  contribution  of  school  to  pupil’s  academic  progress  is  argued  to  be  a  more 
appropriate reflection of school performance (Downes, 2007; Hanushek and Taylor, 1990; 
Mayer, 1997; Hanushek 1992; Summers and Wolfe, 1977). This argument soon found its 
way to house price regressions, with several authors asking whether VA or test score 
should be used as measures of school quality in hedonic analysis of house prices. The 
empirical evidence so far appears to be controversial. Gibbons et al (2008) using UK data 
find that simple VA and prior score indicators both have a positive and significant effect on 
house  prices.  In  contrast,  Downes  and  Zabel  (2002),  using  data  from  the  Chicago 
metropolitan area find that only final score is significant; a result supported by Brasington 
(1999). Furthermore, Brasington and Haurin (2006) find that while the effect of VA on 
house prices is positive when used on its own, it becomes negative when score is also 
included in the hedonic equation. 
In principle, CVA indicators discriminate in favour of schools operating under conditions 
non-conducive to learning, such as pupils with poor socio-economic background, ethically 
heterogeneous classes, poor/interrupted attendance etc. As such, a CVA index can guide 
the so called ‘pupil premium’ funding program proposed by the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats with the aim of narrowing the achievement gap between rich and poor, by 
attaching  greater  weight  to  schools  with  pupils  from  disadvantaged  backgrounds.  The 
need  for  using  CVA  type  indicators  to  help  disadvantaged  schools  through  funding 
discrimination  in  their  favour  is  also  evident  in  the  US,  where  the  grant  program  of 3 
 
President Barack Obama's introduced in response to the 2008 economic crisis provides 
$100  billion  for  schools,  while  asking  federal  officials  to  focus  their  proposals,  among 
others, on ‘turning around low-performing schools’1. 
The  CVA  indicator  used  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  this  paper  has  been  recently 
introduced by the Department for Children, Schools and Families in England and adjusts 
the final score achieved by pupils to take account of limitations imposed on their school 
performance by low prior achievement and other pupil-specific characteristics reflecting 
on  disadvantaged  socioeconomic  background  (Appendix).  The  fact  that  CVA  combines 
final score with non-components, mainly reflecting the extent to which a school operates 
in a deprived socioeconomic environment, can obscure its effect on house prices. As said 
earlier these two components of CVA can affect house prices in opposite direction: houses 
in  the  catchment  area  of  schools  with  higher  final  score  are  higher  in  price;  whereas 
socioeconomic deprivation characteristics decrease the prices of houses in the affected 
area. Thus, by separating the effect of final score and non-score components on house 
prices  one  can  highlight  how  a  CVA  indicator  compromises  private  (household) 
preferences for high academic achievement (final score) with the social preferences for 
discriminating  in  favour  of  schools  with  high  non-score  (deprivation)  indicators.  For 
instance,  a  large  negative  effect  of  the  non-score  component  on  house  prices  can  be 
interpreted as an indication that low school performance is largely due to the final score 
being  eroded  by  a  disadvantaged  background,  pointing  to  the  need  for  greater  policy 
intervention.  
Another  novelty  of  the  empirical  analysis  in  this  paper  is  the  use  of  non-parametric 
techniques  to  explore  non-linearity  in  the  relationship  between  school  performance 
indicators and house prices. This is useful because school performance is measured by 
arbitrarily normalised indices and is customary in empirical application to (re)normalised 
them to measure standard deviations from the mean. Therefore, the use of square and 
cubic terms of these indices to explore higher order effects on house price in hedonic 
regression is meaningless.2 Interestingly, this point and, in general, the presence of non -
linear and non-monotonic effects of  school quality indicators on house prices has not 
received adequate attention in the literature.  
                                                             
1 Studies focusing on education spending in the US and its distribution across communities include Fernandez 
and Rogerson (1996, 1998) and Chay et al (2005). 
2 While one can avoid the sign problem by dividing by the standard deviation and not differencing from the 
mean, the empirical estimates will still depend on the units of measurement of the school performance. 4 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from three UK sources: (i) individual 
house prices collected from the electronic site “Up my Street”; (ii) school quality indicators 
from the primary and secondary performance tables, available from the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families; and (iii) deprivations indices and other neighbourhood 
characteristics from  the Office  of  National  Statistics  of  UK.  The  data  on school  quality 
include  a  CVA  and  final  score  indicators.  More  details  about  the  data  are  given  in 
Appendix. 
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 describes the methodology followed in 
order to estimate the distinct (marginal) contribution of the various groups of variables 
entering a broadly defined CVA indicator of school quality. Section 3 briefly describes the 
data and presents the estimates obtained from semi-parametric and parametric empirical 
analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Modelling the effect of school quality on house prices 
In  this  section  we deliberate  on  the  components  of  a   CVA  indicator  with  a  view  to 
modelling  their  effect  on  house  prices  in  a  way  that  facilitates  the   interpretation  and 
highlights the policy implications of results obtained from empirical application. 
We break down the variables affecting school  performance which  are exogenous to the 
school  into:  (i)  pupil-specific  (ability  and family  background),  denoted by   ;  and  (ii) 
neighbourhood-specific (crime, poverty, environment, ethnic heterogeneity etc), denoted 
by  . In this context CVA, denoted by  , can be defined as the expected final score   
achieved  at  given  values  of     and  ,  i.e.             ).  When  one  wishes  to  focus  on 
progress during a particular period of school attendance, e.g. secondary education, CVA 
can be also conditioned on prior achievement, denoted by   and defined as the final score 
achieved prior to the period over which CVA is measured. In this case the CVA can be 
written as                    or, more generally,               .3 
The fact that CVA is a composite indicator of school performance raises the question how 
the various components of this indicator reflect on household perception of school quality 
and, thereby, on house prices. To examine this question we consider the following hedonic 
                                                             
3 This definition of VA comes close to what the Department of Education, Children and Families in the UK 
terms ‘contextual’ VA  used in the empirical analysis below. 5 
 
equation for the cross-section analysis of the (log) price   of house        .   in school 
catchment area         ,  
                                           ,          (1)  
where:             .    is  the  vector  of  house-specific  variables  (size,  type  etc)  and 
            .   the vector of neighbourhood-specific variables affecting house prices; 
                   .  , and               .   are parameters; and     is a randomly 
distributed error. 
To keep matters simple we consider the effect of various components of CVA on house 
prices assuming that     in equation (1) is defined as the final score achieved by the school, 
linearly modified to account for prior achievement and pupil- and neighbourhood-specific 
factors affecting school performance,  
                                     ,            (2) 
where                 , and                  are some known parameters.  
Replacing (2) in (1) we obtain the reduced form hedonic equation  
                                                                 (3) 
where        shows the effect of    on price;         ,         , ... ,          the effect of 
variables  in  the  vector     ;  and               ,                     ,  ....  ,      
           the effect of variables in the vector     .  
As said in the introduction, CVA indicators discriminate in favour of schools operating 
under disadvantageous conditions (such as low prior achievement, poor socio-economic 
background, ethically heterogeneous classes and poor attendance), effectively awarding 
higher marks to schools that achieve a given final score in circumstances non-conducive to 
learning. In the context of equation (3) household aversion to such circumstances can be 
estimated and contrasted with preference for final score and other desirable components 
of  the  CVA.  More  specifically,  the  parameter     in  equation  (3)  should  be  positive, 
indicating the willingness of households to pay for high final score, a conjecture strongly 
supported by empirical evidence in the literature. In contrast, the parameter        is 
likely to be negative: reaching a given final score starting with a high prior achievement 
represents poor school performance (low value added, i.e.      ).  6 
 
The effect of variables other than    and    in (3), however, is unclear and will depend on 
how  they  are  incorporated  in  the  construction  of  the  CVA  indicator.  For  instance,  the 
effects of pupil-specific characteristics will be negative or positive, depending on whether 
the variables in the     vector increase or decrease with learning capacity. The effect of 
neighbourhood-specific variables in the vector     , is also ambiguous: assuming that these 
variables measure deprivation the parameters    in (2) will be positive (achieving a given 
final score in deprived neighbourhoods increases VA); whereas the parameters    will be 
negative (neighbourhood deprivation decreases house prices). Therefore, the effects of 
neighbourhood characteristics,              , which are obtained from estimating (3) 
may be positive or negative, depending on which of the two components - the direct effect 
on house prices    or the indirect effect through VA     - dominates. 
The discussion above assumes that one knows how the contextual value is constructed, 
how it can be decomposed and how its individual elements can be used as variables in the 
house price equation. In practice, CVA is likely to be published in the form of an index 
representing the outcome of complex quantitative and qualitative manipulations of final 
and prior score and other variables, making it impossible to identify the component effects 
of  CVA on house prices, by estimating a reduced form equation like (3). Indeed, this is the 
case with the English data used in the empirical analysis in this paper. This limitation 
necessitates modification of the theoretical analysis described above as follows. 
Recall that the focus of investigation in this paper is to compare the effect of final score 
with  that  of  other  components  of  the  CVA  indicator.  We  therefore  define  CVA  as  an 
unknown  function  of  final  score,  prior  achievement  and  a  range  of  pupil-specific 
characteristics.4 We denote this by         (           .    . To separate the effect of    
from that of    and      .    we project    on     to obtain    
              , i.e. make the 
CVA indicator orthogonal to the final score5. Then, estimating the house price equation  
                      
                            ,        (4) 
the parameter   captures the effect of final score    on house prices, while   captures the 
effect of    
 , i.e. the information contained in CVA other than final score. This additional 
information comes from prior achievement    and pupil-specific characteristics      .   .  
                                                             
4 The contextual value added used in our analysis does not take into account the impact of neighbourhood 
characteristics on school performance.  
5 The non-score component (V*) is defined as the residuals from regressing CVA on its score component. 7 
 
In  the  empirical  analysis  that  follows  we  use  equations  (1)  and  (4)  for  primary  and 
secondary education in England to: (i) estimate the relationships between CVA and house 
prices; and (ii) find how this relationship is shaped by each of the two components of CVA, 
score and non-score, as these are defined above. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
The postal address of households participating in official UK data surveys (e.g. the Family 
Expenditure  and  General  Household  surveys)  is  unavailable  to  the  public  for 
confidentiality  reasons.  In  this  sub-section  we  describe  briefly  the data  used  in  the 
empirical  analysis in  this  paper  which are  drawn  from various sources,  as detailed in 
Appendix. 
The individual house price data are collected during 2008 from the internet site “Up my 
Street”, which advertises houses for sale in the UK. In addition to prices,    , also collected 
from this site are the house-specific variables denoted by the vector            .   in 
equation (4), i.e. number of bedrooms, number of total rooms, type of the house, postal 
code etc. The average price of houses in our sample is around 252.000 GBP and 272.000 
GBP for primary and secondary school datasets, respectively.  
The two main school quality indicators used in our empirical analysis, the score and CVA, 
   and    , come from the primary and secondary education performance tables, available 
from the Department for Children, Schools and Families. These tables include background 
information on the schools in 2007.  
  For primary education the score indicates the proportion of pupils reaching Level 4 in 
the Key Stage 2 (KS2) standard assessment tests administered at age 11; in our sample 
this proportion averages to around 81%6. 
  For secondary education the score indicates the proportion of pupils aged 15 years who 
pass five or more General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) subjects at grades 
A to C; in our sample this proportion is, on average, around 47%.  
                                                             
6 Concern about a censored regression problem is mitigated by the fact that none of the schools has 100% 
proportion of pupils reaching Level 4. Indeed, only 5% of the sample are above 95%. 8 
 
England is the only state so far, where a national CVA indicator is constructed for primary 
and secondary schools using annual pupil-level data collected by the Pupil Level Annual 
Schools  Census  (PLASC).  Initially  simple  value  added  indicators  were  constructed  by 
adjusting  the  score  indicator  described  above  to  take  into  account  pupils’  prior 
achievement. The more complex CVA indicator used in this paper, is calculated - using 
multilevel models – for all pupils as the difference (positive or negative) between their 
own 'output' point score and the median achieved by others with the same or similar 
‘starting’  or ‘input') point score, after taking account the contextual factors collecting by 
PLASC. In our sample the average CVA indicator is equal to 99.92 for primary schools and 
1002.02 for secondary schools7.  
Data  on  deprivation  indices  and  other  neighbourhood  characteristics,  denoted  by  the 
vector             .   in (4), come from the Office of National Statistics of UK. All data 
collected  cover  the  period  June-September  2008  and  include  deprivation  indices  of 
income, crime, environment, housing barriers, health, and employment, and information 
about the density and non-domestic buildings in an area.8 
3.2 Semi-parametric analysis 
The CVA indicator, as implied from the means given above, is an arbitrarily normalised 
‘ordinal’ measure of school performance. Indeed, this is the case for most published school 
quality indicators and can create problems of comparison and interpretation in empirical 
analysis. To avoid such problems investigators often (re)normalise school performance 
indicators to measure standard deviations from the mean. The measurement of a school 
quality indicator in standard deviations, however, limits the ability of the investigator to 
explore  non-linearity  in  the  relationship  between  this  indicator  and  house  prices  in 
hedonic regression, insofar as higher order (quadratic or cubic) standard deviations can 
complicate interpretation and/or comparability of results across studies. In this context 
semi-parametric analysis can be a useful tool for investigating non-linear effects of school 
                                                             
7 The fact that secondary CVA is V at 16 (final scores) minus V at 11 (prior scores), and primary CVA is V at 11 
(final scores) minus V at 7 (prior scores) shows that there is a relationship between the two. However, this 
relationship cannot be exploited in this analysis because the available data measure school and not pupil 
performance. Details about the calculation methods and the range of background factors used in construction 
of CVA are given in Appendix. 
8 The houses allocated to the catchment area of a particular school are, on average, 0.2 miles away from it 
(range 0 to 1 miles). The results obtained from the empirical analysis do not change significantly if the smaller 
house-to-school maximum distances of 0.5 miles and 0.2 miles are used. This suggests that the catchment area 
may cover a fairly large radius around the school.  9 
 
quality on house prices and, thereby, for finding appropriate ways to specify these effects 
in parametric analysis.  
The semi-parametric estimator used in this paper is the ‘nearest neighbour’ one proposed 
by Estes and Honore (1995)9, briefly described as follows.  
We write equation (1) as 
                                                        (5) 
where        is an unknown function, while all variables and notation in (5) are as defined 
in  (1).  Next  we  sort  the  data  by    ,  and  compute  the  differences:                    ; 
                  , all k; and                      , all m; where the subscript ‘- ’ indicates 
the previous observation.  
We then estimate the regression 
                                  .            (6) 
      measures  the  difference  in  house  price  between  the  current  observation  and  the 
observation that has a     value closest to the current. Note that, as the data are sorted by     
(a continuous variable) no matter what the functional form of          is, the difference 
              and can be ignored.  
Using  the  parameter  estimates  obtained  from  (6),  we  compute  the  part  of       not 
explained by the right hand side variables, 
                                      . 
and  perform  separate  semi-parametric  regression  of        on  CVA  using  two  alternative 
bandwidths, 0.2 and 0.8: the smaller bandwidth highlights details in the data, whereas the 
bigger bandwidth helps towards defining a parsimonious parametric model.  
Figure 1 plots the weighted Gaussian kernel estimates of the relationship between log 
house prices and CVA for primary (part A) and secondary (part B) schools. In the case of 
primary schools it is clear that this relationship is positive for both bandwidths employed, 
                                                             
9 This semi-parametric estimator is less efficient than Robinson's (1988) estimator but has computational 
advantages and is easier to implement. To eliminate kernel estimates based on a small number of observations 
we drop 2% of the sample from each end of the distribution. 10 
 
0.2  and  0.8.  For  secondary  schools,  however,  no  (positive  or  negative)  relationship 
appears to exist between log house prices and CVA. ‘Forcing’ the data to yield such a 
relationship with the large bandwidth (0.8) results in a complicated cubic pattern, where 
the effect on log house prices is negative, positive and negative for values of CVA below -
0.83, between -0.83 and +0.73, and above +0.73 deviations from the mean, respectively.  
Figure 1: Kernel estimates for CVA 
 
 
A. Primary schools 
 






     








B. Secondary schools 
  






    








The implications of our semi-parametric findings for modelling and estimating the effect of 
CVA on house prices using hedonic regressions are discussed in the next sub-section. The 
rest of this sub-section focuses on investigating how the score and non-score components 
of CVA are responsible for shaping the lines plotted in Figure 1. For this we perform semi-
parametric regression of     on score (   ) and non-score (   
 ), following the same nearest 11 
 
neighbour estimator described above.10  The Gaussian kernel weighted estimates obtained 
from these regressions (again, using two bandwidths, 0.2 and 0.8) are plotted in Figure 2.  
Part A1 of Figure 2 reports the  effects of score and Part A2 and the effects of non-score 
component of CVA on log house prices for primary schools. The plots show that score has 
a positive effect on house prices,  although a smaller (0.2) bandwidth  shows this  to be 
interrupted  for  middle  values  of  this  CVA  component.  The  plots  for  the  non -score 
component show that no clear non-score effect on log house prices can be traced, except 
for large values of non-score, where the effect is likely to be positive. Put together, these 
results suggest that the positive effect of CVA on house prices shown for  primary schools 
in Part A of Figure 1 is primarily attributed to its score component.  
The results obtained from semi-parametric analysis of secondary school data, shown in 
Figure 2 for the score (Part B1) and non-score (Part B2) components of CVA, indicate a 
clearly positive relationship between the score component of CVA and log house prices. In 
contrast, the relationship between the non-score component and log house prices appears 
to be negative and less strong than the one corresponding to score component. It should 
be noted here that the opposite effect of score and non-score on house prices is probably 
the reason why the CVA indicator appears to have a non-significant effect on house prices 
in the analysis of secondary school data (Figure 1, Part B). 
3.3 Parametric Analysis 
The semi-parametric results discussed above imply that the effect of CVA ( and its score 
and non-score components) on log house prices may or may not be linear and monotonic. 
As said  earlier, the existence of  non-linear  and  non-monotonic  effects of CVA on house 
prices  can  complicate  interpretation  and/or  cross -study  comparison  of higher  order 
(quadratic or cubic) terms, because the CVA and its components are measured in standard 
deviations  from  the  mean.   Here  we  circumvent  this  problem  by  incorporating  non -
linearity  and  non-monotonicity  in  the  effects  of  CVA  on  house  prices  using  dummy 
variables,    for        , in the hedonic regression  
                                                      .        (1’)  
                                                             
10 The non-score component (V 
   is defined as the residuals from regressing CVA on its score component. 
Given the orthogonality of    and V 
  we investigate the semi-parametric relationship between r     and each of 
the two indicators of school quality separately. 12 
 
Figure 2: Kernel estimates for the score and non-score CVA components 
A. Primary schools 
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B. Secondary schools 
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For instance, we create and include in   ’  two dummy variables: D1=1 if CVA< 1.75 and 
D1=0 otherwise; and D2=1 if D1=0 and D2=0 otherwise, where  1.75 is the value of CVA 
where the slope of the line in the corresponding semi-parametric plot (top right-hand side 
in Figure 1) change most. This allows for the effect of CVA on log house prices to differ 
between values below and above the threshold suggested by the semi-parametric results 
reported in Figure 1. In the case of secondary schools we create and include in   ’  three 
dummy variables: D1=1 if CVA< 0.83 and D1=0 otherwise; D2=1 if  0.83 CVA +0.73 
and D2=0 otherwise; and D3=1 if CVA>+0.73 and D3=0. The values  0.83 and +0.73 
correspond to the first and second reflection points of the line in the bottom right semi-
parametric  plot  in  Figure  1,  respectively.  Thus,  the  idea  here  is  to  investigate  the 
possibility arising from the semi-parametric analysis that the effect of CVA on house prices 
is  negative,  positive  and  negative  for  values  of  CVA  below   0.83,  between   0.83  and 
+0.73, and above +0.73 deviations from the mean, respectively.  
The  parameters  corresponding  to  the  score  and  non-score  components  of  CVA  are 
estimated from the hedonic regression 
                              
                               .       4’  
For primary education  we create and include in  4’   two dummy variables (     ) to 
allow the effect of non-score    
  to differ for values below and above  1.75, the minimum 
attained (with a bandwidth 0.8) in the semi-parametric relationship (Figure 2, Part A2). 
Three dummy variables (     ) are created and included in  4’  for secondary education, 
in this case to investigate the semi-parametric finding that the relationship between non-
score and log house prices is weaker for values of CVA below ﾭ .8   between  0.83 and 
+0.73, and above +0.73 deviations from the mean (Figure 2, Part B2).  
The full regression results obtained from the estimation of   ’  and  4’  are reported in 
Appendix (Table A3). Here, we focus only on results relating to the question how CVA and 
its score and non-score components affect house prices. The parameter estimates helping 
to answer this question are reported in Table 1 and, more or less, conform to expectation 
arising from the non-parametric analysis. In the column under the heading ‘Model I’ are 
the parameter estimates of   ’  where the effect of CVA on log house prices is allowed to 
vary for values above and below  1.75. In the case of primary education the effect of CVA 
is positive and significant only for values above this threshold. For secondary education, 
the effect of CVA on log house price is generally negative but significant only for values 
above +0.73 standard deviations from the mean.  14 
 
Table 1: The effect of CVA and its components on log house prices 
(Robust standard errors in brackets) 
 
A. Primary schools 
Variable  Parameter  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model IV 
  
   
     
 
 (2SLS) 
CVA  β 
   
0.022*** 
   
       
(0.009) ** 
    CVA×D   β1  0.068*** 
       
   
(0.060) ** 
        CVA×D   β2  0.019*** 
       
   
(0.009) ** 




0.035***          0.079*** 
     
(0.008) ** 
 
(0.008) **  (0.027) 
Non-Score  ρ 
     
-0.001***  -0.001 
         
(0.011) **  (0.011) 
Non-Score×D   ρ1 
 
-0.024*** 
     
     
(0.018) ** 
      Non-Score×D   ρ2 
 
0.008*** 
        
 
   (0.013) **          
R-squared    0.851  0.852  0.851  0.852  0.849 
No. of observations  1385  1385  1385  1385  1385 
   
   
B.  Secondary schools 
Variable  Parameter  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model IV 
  
   
     
 
(2SLS) 
CVA  β 
   
-0.027*** 
   
       
(0.009) ** 
    CVA×D   β1  -0.016*** 
       
   
(0.017) ** 
        CVA×D   β2  -0.026*** 
       
   
(0.021) ** 
        CVA×D   β3  -0.035*** 
       
   
(0.015) ** 




0.039***          0.068*** 
     
(0.010) ** 
 
(0.010) **  (0.024) 
Non-Score  ρ 
     
-0.043***         -0.046*** 
         
(0.010) **  (0.011) 
Non-Score×D   ρ1 
 
-0.031*** 
     
     
(0.020) ** 
      Non-Score×D   ρ2 
 
-0.048*** 
               (0.012) **          
R-squared    0.837  0.84  0.837  0.84  0.838 
No. of observations  1209  1209  1209  1209  1209 
               Notes: *** and ** indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 15 
 
In the column under the heading ‘Model II’ are the parameter estimates of  4’   where the 
effects of score and non-score components of CVA are estimated separately. The results 
demonstrate  the  positive  and  significant  effect  of  score  on  log  house  prices  at  both 
primary  and  secondary  levels  of  education.  In  contrast,  the  effect  of  the  non-score 
component is negative and significant only for secondary education and for values above -
0.82 standard deviations from the mean. 
The parameters in Table 1 reported in the columns under the headings ‘Model III' and 
‘Model IV’ correspond to the estimation of   ’  and  4’ , assuming that β    β and ρ    ρ 
for all        , respectively, i.e. the effect of CVA and its components on log house prices 
is assumed to be linear. As expected this assumption is accepted for both equations and 
levels of education, given that when the effect (slope) of each variable is differentiated by 
dummies, only one of these effects is statistically significant.11 
‘Model IV’ is also estimated by 2SLS (last column of Table 1) in order to get round the 
problem of potential endogeneity and measurement error of the score component of CVA. 
As Gibbons and Machin (2003) suggest school performance is likely to be related to house 
prices through factors other than school quality sorting: prosperous parents may purchase 
houses  in  neighbourhoods  with  better  amenities,  so  schools  in  these  neighbourhoods 
perform better because their pupils are more receptive to education.12 In addition, results 
published in the national tables (a single year measure) can be noisy measures of long-run 
school quality.  
As in Gibbons and Machin (2003), we  investigate the endogeneity and/or measurement 
error  problems  by  instrumenting  school  quality  indicators  with  variables  that  are 
available in the school performance tables. More specifically the instruments used for the 
CVA are the school type, the admissions age-range and the student gender (available only 
for secondary schools). The 2-SLS results suggest that the effect of score component on 
house prices is higher than that obtained from simple regression. This is the case for both 
primary and secondary schools. The same upward 2-S S ‘correction’ of the score effect on 
house prices estimated by simple regression is reported by Gibbons and Machin (2003) 
indicating that errors in the measurement of the score variable may be a more serious 
                                                             
11 The F-values are: 0.66 for β    β    β in primary and 0.31 for β    β    β    β in secondary education; 
and 0.11 for  ρ    ρ    ρ in primary and .50 for ρ    ρ    ρ in secondary education. 
12 At the same time, however, one has to be cautious  16 
 
source  of  bias  than  unaccounted  endogeneity  from  neighbourhood  quality  effects  on 
school performance.13 
It is worth noting here that one can also consider the use of CVA and, specifically, its non-
score component as a potential instrument for tackling the endogeneity of final score. To 
investigate this possibility  in the case of the primary schools  (where  the non-score 
component of CVA  appears to be exogenous  - Model II in Tabl e 2.1A)  we include this 
variable as an instrument  for the final score along with the school type, the admissions 
age-range and the student gender. The results remain unchanged, i.e. the score coefficient 
is 0.079*** as is without using the non-score as an the instrument for the score component 
of CVA (Model IV in Table 2.1A), suggesting that the additional instrument does not add to 
identification.
14 
The conclusion emerging from the parametric and non-parametric analysis so far is that 
CVA has a  significant positive effect on house price in the case of primary and a  strong 
significant negative effect in the case of secondary education.  By separating the overall 
effect of the CVA indicator into its score and non-score components, it becomes evident 
that positive CVA effect on house prices in the analysis of primary school data is entirely 
attributed  to  the  score  component;  whereas  the  negative  effect  in  the  analysis  of 
secondary school data is due to the large and significant negative effect of the non-score 
component, which more than compensates the equally significant but not so large positive 
effect of the score component.  
The  estimates  reported  in  Table  1   are  conditional  on  Local  Authorities  (LA)   –  see 
Appendix  A3.  As  such  they  reflect  the  effect  of  CVA  and  its  score  and  non-score 
components on house prices ‘within’  As and are interpreted as indicators of willingness 
to pay for school quality by households already located in a particular LA. In order to also 
investigate  how  differences  in school  quality  affect  house  prices  ‘between’   As  we  re-
estimate   ’  and  4’  using the LA means. The results of these estimations are reported in 
Table 2. 
                                                             
13 One can argue here that the IV estimates can be associated with a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), 
i.e. reflect on observations in the sample to which the instrument is relevant, for instance changes in CVA can 
be specific to the school type. Nevertheless, the validity of the instruments used in the paper is supported by 
the high F-statistics (68.5 for primary and 75.8 for secondary schools) and the fact that over-identification 
tests, based on the R-square obtained from regressing the predicted errors from the 2-SLS estimation on all 
exogenous variables, suggest that all models are just identified.  
14  The  same  exogeneity  test  cannot  be  used  in  the  case  of  the  secondary  schools  because  the  non-score 
component of CVA is not exogenous (Model IV in Table 2.1B).  17 
 
For primary schools, the results in Table 2 suggest that the between LAs effect of CVA on 
house prices is positive, as is within LAs (Table 1). However, the estimated parameter now 
is larger in size and significance compared to that estimated within LAs. Furthermore, the 
enhancement  of  the  CVA  effect  between  LAs  appears  to  come  from  equal  in  size  and 
significance contributions from both the score and non-score components; unlike the LA-
conditional CVA effect, which is attributed entirely to score. This means that households 
are willing to pay a higher price for houses in LAs where primary schools have, on average, 
higher non-score and score components of CVA; whereas, once they are in a given LA, their 
willingness to pay a higher price for a house is limited only to primary schools with a high 
score.  
Table 2: Estimated parameters 'between' Local Authorities  
(robust standard errors in brackets) 
Variable  Parameter     Primary schools        Secondary schools 
CVA      0.315*** 




     (0.090) ** 
   
(0.064) 
 
Score     





   
(0.072) ** 
Non-Score    





   
(0.065) ** 
R-squared    0.920  0.921    0.907  0.908 
No. of observations    51  51    51  51 
Notes: *** and ** indicate significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
 
The parameters for secondary schools reported in Table 2, again, change substantially 
compared to those obtained conditional on LA-specific effects. In this case, however, the 
CVA and its score and non-score components do not have a significant effect on house 
prices. For instance, while within LAs house prices are reduced, on average, by 2,7% for an 
increase in the standard deviation of CVA by one unit, house prices across LAs do not 
appear to be affected. Also, the results in Table 1 suggest that within LAs house prices are 
lower in catchment areas of secondary schools with a high CVA; while Table 2 suggests 
that  between  LAs  house  prices  are  not  significantly  associated  with  CVA  differences 
between these schools. On the basis of these results one can argue that the willingness of 
households to pay more for a high quality secondary education appears to depend entirely 




The impact  of  educational  output,  as  measured  by  s tudent  test scores  on  standardised 
tests,  on house  values is consistently  positive  (Black,  1999;  Gibbons  and Machin,  2003; 
Haurin and Brasington, 2006; Rosenthal, 2003), suggesting that families are willing to pay 
for higher educational output. The same house price effect, however, is not so clear when 
measures  of  school  quality  other  than  educational  output  are  used  in  the  hedonic 
regression, e.g. educational inputs, usually expenditure per pupil (Haurin and Brasington, 
1996; Brasington, 1999; Black,1999; Downes and Zabel, 1992); and value added (VA), as 
measured  by the  growth  of  student  achievement over  time  (Hayes  and  Taylor,  1996; 
Brasington, 1999; Haurin and Brasington, 2006; Downes and Zabel, 2002).  
This paper focuses on the relationship between house prices and a new measure of school 
quality recently introduced in England, termed Contextual Value Added (CVA). Unlike VA 
the CVA rewards growth of student achievement that takes place under disadvantageous 
conditions,  such  as poor  socio-economic  background, ethically  heterogeneous  classes, 
poor/interrupted  attendance  etc.   The  emphasis  in  the paper  is  on:  (i)  finding  an 
appropriate empirical specification to capture the effects of this school indicator and its 
score (school factor) and non-score (non-school factor) components on house prices; and 
(ii) highlighting the potential heterogeneity in these effects at different levels of education 
and between neighbourhoods and spatially larger entities, like Local Authorities (LAs). 
To our knowledge Hayes and Taylor (1996) are the first to consider VA in investigating 
the  relationship  between  house  prices  and school  quality.  U sing Dallas  data they  try  to 
separate the impact of achievement score on house prices into school (value added) and 
demographic composition (peer group) effects and find only the former to be significant. 
Brasington (1999) considers the impact of VA on house prices, along with several other  
measures of educational inputs, for the six largest metropolitan areas of Ohio. Measuring 
VA as the percentage change in the number of proficient students  and using a variety of 
relative performance indices in hedonic and a spatial analysis he too finds no evidence of 
VA impact on house prices. More specifically, the results show the effect of VA to vary from 
positive  to  negative  (and  zero)  between metropolitan  areas;  in  contrast  test  score 
measures, expenditure per pupil and teacher salary are found to have a positive effect on 
house prices. These results are reinforced by Brasington and Haurin (2006) who find no 
evidence of capitalization of alternative VA measures into the prices of 77000 houses sold 19 
 
in 2000 in Ohio. In fact, after defining VA as in Brasington (1999) they obtain a negative 
effect on house prices when controlling for score and expenditure per pupil.  
Gibbons et al (2009) investigate the effect of VA and prior achievement on house prices for 
UK  primary  schools  during  the  period  2003-2006  using  boundary  discontinuity 
regressions.  They  find  that  a  one-standard  deviation  change  in  either  VA  or  prior 
achievement  raises  prices  by  around  3-4%.  It  is  important  to  stress  here  there  is  no 
contradiction between these results and those reported in the US studies discussed above, 
where VA does not appear to affect house prices. This is because Gibbons et al (2009) 
condition the VA effect on prior achievement, whereas the VA effect in the US studies is 
conditioned on final score. Therefore (i) the prior achievement parameter in Gibbons et al 
(2009)  is  equivalent  to  the  final  score  parameter  in  the  US  studies;  and  (ii)  the  VA 
parameter  in  Gibbons  et  al  (2009)  is  equivalent  to  the  sum  of  final  score  and  VA 
parameters in the US studies.15 
The empirical findings in our analysis complement those obtained in the literature, insofar 
as we use a CVA measure recently introduced in England to investigate the effect of school 
quality on house prices. The relationship between school performance and house prices is 
more difficult to analyse when a CVA, rather than a VA, measure is used because the CVA 
also accounts for various non-school factors affecting educational outcomes. For instance, 
we find  the effect of CVA on house prices  to be positive for  primary and  negative for 
secondary  schools.  The  heterogeneity  of  the  results  at  different  education  levels   is 
explained when the CVA effect is broken into its  score and non-score components: the 
former is positive and strongly significant for both primary and secondary schools ; while 
the latter is significant and negative for secondary  and insignificant for primary schools. 
Viewing this result in the context of the studies discussed above, one can argue that our 
results confirm what most other investigators report in the literature, i.e. other indicators 
of school quality do not have a significant positive effect on house prices once controlled 
for the final score.  
An explanation why the analysis of secondary school data shows the non-score component 
of CVA to have a significantly negative effect on house price may be that pupils at this level 
of education can vary substantially in their prior achievement, the most important item in 
                                                             
15 To see this write the house price equation                , where  =       is value added,   final score 
and   prior achievement. Replacing     with       gives                      . 20 
 
the non-score part of CVA; whereas the opposite is true for primary schools, because there 
can  be  little  variation  in  prior  achievement  among  pupils  at  the  beginning  of  their 
education.16 Furthermore, the negative sign of the effect of the non -score component of 
CVA on house prices in the analysis of secondary school data can be attributed to the fact 
that reaching a given final score starting from a high  (low) initial level subtracts from 
(adds to) the school’s image of quality.  
In  addition  to  differences  between  the  results  obtained  from  primary  and  secondary 
school data, we have found heterogeneity in the effect of CVA depending on whether this 
effect relates to house price variation within or between LAs. For example, we find that for 
primary schools CVA has a positive effect on house prices between LAs, indicating the  
willingness of households to pay a higher price for houses in LAs where primary schools 
have, on average, a higher CVA, either due to the score or the non-score component. This 
can be interpreted as highlighting the ‘public good’ nature of this school quality indicator 
and suggests that the school quality aspects reflected in a high CVA (achieving a high final 
score  against  the  odds  of  low  prior  achievement,  a  large  proportion  of  pupils  whose 
mother tongue is not English and other circumstances non-conducive to learning) may be 
diffused over a greater geographical area than that of the catchment area of a particular 
school. However, the same cannot be said about secondary schools for which the empirical 
analysis suggests that higher house prices in the catchment area  of  schools at this level of 
education is entirely a reflection of the score component of the school's CVA within the LA; 
while the non-score component appears to be either irrelevant (between LA's) or affect 
house prices negatively (within LAs).  
A limitation of the empirical analysis in this paper is the inability to analyse separately the 
relationship between each individual component of CVA and house prices, due to the fact 
that the Department of Education, Children and Families of the UK does not publish this 
information. While the separation of the score from the non-score components attempted 
in the paper helps illustrate the potential heterogeneity of the effects of CVA on house 
prices, itemising the non-score components (to prior achievement, proportion of pupils in 
disadvantaged  groups  etc)  would  enable  one  to reach  more  informed  conclusions,  for 
instance, about how households value private and social aspects of school quality.  
                                                             
16 To test this conjecture we have regressed CVA on its score component: the results showed that 41% of the 
variation in CVA among primary schools is explained by this component; whereas for secondary schools, the 
corresponding figure was only 18%. 21 
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper highlights the usefulness and complexities of trying to estimate 
the impact of Contextual Value Added - a more comprehensive measure of school quality - 
on  house  prices  using  hedonic  regressions.  In  general,  the  fact  that  this  measure plays 
down the  importance  of final  score,  evidently a very desirable  aspect  of  school  quality 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  private  household,  is  shown  to weaken  (or reverse)  the 
positive link between school performance and house prices. Yet, households with children 
in primary education appear to pay a higher price for housing in Local Authorities with 
schools  showing high  non-score  quality  characteristics. In  terms  of  policy , our  findings 
suggest that a Local Authority can pay attention to improving the non-score aspects of the 
CVA of its primary schools, knowing  that  this can make it an attractive location among 
households  looking  for  high  quality primary  education.  However,  the  willingness  of 
households to pay more for a house in the catchment area of a school offering high quality 
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Appendix 
A1. Data sources 
Our data come from three major independent sources. The house price and characteristics data have been 
drawn from the electronic site “Up my Street”17. The school quality data come from the primary and secondary 
school  performance  tables,  available  from  the  Department  for  Children,  Schools  and  Families18, and  the 
deprivations indices and other neighbourhood characteristics from the Office of National Statistics19. 
The data collection process from the three different sources was as follows: England is divided in nine regions 
consisting of one hundred fifty Local Authorities (LAs). Fifty LAs were chosen, one third from each region, half 
with a larger and the other half with a lower mean grade than the England average.20 From each of these LAs 
six schools were  randomly selected, three with a higher and three with a lower  grade mean  than the LA 
average. This process was accomplished separately for primary and secondary schools.  
Using the school postcode we were able to locate the six houses closest to the school that were up for sale 
using information from the Up my Street website. We  collected information on the selling price o f houses, 
house characteristics and distance from school. The average distance from the local primary or secondary 
school was around 0.20 miles and in no case more than one mile. 
The site of Neighbourhood Statistics provides detailed statistics within specific geographic areas , including 
deprivation indices  of income, crime, environment, housing barriers, health, and employment and other 
neighbourhood characteristics like population density. In order to capture neighbourhood characteristics, we 
used the “lower layer super output area21” for each specific postcode and collected the following indicators:  
- Income: the proportion of the population living in low income families.  
- Employment: involuntary exclusion from work of working age population.  
- Health and Disability: rate of premature death, poor health and disability.  
- Barriers to Housing and Services: barriers to GP premises, supermarkets, primary schools and post offices, 
divided into 'geographical barriers' and 'wider barriers'.  
-  iving Environment: ‘Indoors’ measuring the quality of housing and ‘outdoors’ measuring the air quality and 
road traffic accidents. 
- Crime: the rate of recorded crime (burglary, theft, criminal damage and violence).  
- Density: the number of persons per hectare22. 
 
                                                             
17From this  site we had access  in all  properties  which have been  bought and  sold in  the whole of England.  (website: 
www.upmystreet.com/property-prices/find-a-property/l/n13+5rx.html) 
18School performance tables include background information such as type of schools, are range of pupils and gender of 
pupils (website: www.dcsf.gov.uk/index.htm) 
19 Website: www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination 
20 For those regions containing a number of LAs that could not be divided by three, the number of LAs finally chosen was 
rounded up or down to the nearest one third of the total number of LAs. 
21 Roughly one LA is divided into 100 -150 Lower Layer Super Output Areas.  For example, Islington (LA) has 175,000 
residents and it is divided into 117 Lower Layer Super Output Areas. Thus, on average each Lower Layer Area has around 
1,500 residents. Also, on average there are 2, 5 persons per household. Hence, a lower layer area has about 600 households  
22 Resident people per hectare in the area at the time of the 2001 Census.  25 
 
A2. Value Added and Contextual Value Added  
Value added (VA) is a measure of the progress pupils make between different stages of education. The VA 
score  for  each  pupil,  as defined  by  the  Department  of  Education,  Children and  Families  of  the  UK,  is  the 
difference (positive or negative) between their own 'output' point score and the median - or middle - output 
point  score  achieved  by  others  with  the  same  or  similar  starting  point,  or  'input'  point  score.  Thus,  an 
individual pupil's progress is compared with the progress made by other pupils with the same or similar prior 
attainment. In order to calculate this measure the Department used a median line approach (Ray, 2006). 
Contextual Value Added (CVA) was introduced in order to account for student, family and socioeconomic 
characteristics affecting the progress made by pupils. The technique used to derive a CVA score is called multi-
level modelling (MLM) performed in four stages:     obtain a prediction of attainment based on the pupil’s 
prior attainment; (2) adjust this prediction to take account of the pupil’s set of characteristics;     for key 
stage 2-4 adjust further to account for school level prior attainment and (4) calculate the CVA by measuring 
the difference (positive or negative) between the pupils actual attainment and that predicted by the CVA 
model. 
The data for the calculation of CVA are drawn from the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC), a national 
dataset for some 600,000 pupils in England.23 The PLASC was introduced in 2002 with the aim of collecting 
contextual data from schools’ administrative records on all pupils annually  i.e. not just at the end of each key 
stage). The main variables in the PLASC data used in the calculation of CVA are the gender, special educational 
needs, ethnicity, eligibility for free schools meals, language, date of entry/mobility, age, being in care and the 
income deprivation affecting children index.  
The CVA measure for primary schools is normalised to 100, whereas for secondary schools the same measure 
is normalised to 1000: scores above (below) these norms represent schools where students made more (less) 
progress than similar students nationally. The table below shows  
Table A2.1 The distribution of the CVA score indicator  
Primary schools  Secondary schools  Percentiles nationally 
101.5 and above  1041.11 and above  Top 5% 
100.6 to 101.4  1013.41 to 1041.10  Next 20% 
100.2 to 100.5  1006.11 to 1013.40  Next 15% 
 99.8 to 100.1   997.61 to 1006.10  Middle 20% 
 99.4 to 99.7   990.66 to 997.60  Next 15% 
 98.5 to 99.3   971.54 to 990.65  Next 20% 
 98.4 and above                             971.53 and below  Bottom 5% 
 
   
                                                             
23  Some  external  factors  which  are  commonly  thought  to  impact  on  pupil’s  performance   e.g.  parental  education 
status/occupation) are not included in the calculation of CVA because no reliable national data are available. 26 
 




   Primary Schools     Secondary Schools 
            Ln House Price  Model I  Model II     Model I  Model II 
            CVAxD1 (low CVA)  0.068 





   
(0.017) 
  CVAxD2 (middle CVA)  0.019** 





   
(0.021) 
  CVAxD3 (high CVA) 
     
-0.035** 
 
       
(0.015) 
  Score 
 
0.034*** 
   
0.038*** 
   
(0.008) 





   
-0.031 
   
(0.018) 





   
-0.048*** 
   
(0.013) 
   
(0.012) 
            House Characteristics 
          Bedrooms  0.095***  0.094*** 
 
0.097***  0.100*** 
 
(0.015)  (0.015) 
 
(0.017)  (0.017) 
Bathrooms  0.094***  0.093*** 
 
0.034  0.035 
 
(0.021)  (0.021) 
 
(0.025)  (0.024) 
Toilet  -0.011  -0.014 
 
-0.020  -0.022 
 
(0.017)  (0.017) 
 
(0.021)  (0.021) 
Totalrooms  0.056***  0.056*** 
 
0.080***  0.078*** 
 
(0.008)  (0.008) 
 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
Garage  0.038***  0.038*** 
 
0.061***  0.059*** 
 
(0.014)  (0.014) 
 
(0.015)  (0.015) 
Semidetached  -0.098***  -0.095*** 
 
-0.138***  -0.133*** 
 
(0.021)  (0.020) 
 
(0.021)  (0.021) 
Flat  -0.271***  -0.270*** 
 
-0.154***  -0.163*** 
 
(0.031)  (0.031) 
 
(0.037)  (0.037) 
Terrace  -0.168***  -0.170*** 
 
-0.187***  -0.185*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.026) 
 
(0.034)  (0.033) 
Midterrace  -0.217***  -0.218*** 
 
-0.264***  -0.266*** 
 
(0.028)  (0.028) 
 
(0.031)  (0.031) 
Endterrace  -0.206***  -0.203*** 
 
-0.210***  -0.211*** 
 
(0.031)  (0.031) 
 
(0.031)  (0.031) 
Maisonette  -0.264***  -0.268*** 
 
-0.285***  -0.294*** 
 
(0.043)  (0.044) 
 
(0.049)  (0.049) 
Other  -0.079**  -0.081** 
 
-0.007  -0.011 
 
(0.040)  (0.040) 
 
(0.057)  (0.056) 
Neighborhood Characteristics 
          Income_deprivation  -0.046**  -0.039** 
 
-0.008**  -0.010** 
 
(0.019)  (0.019) 
 
(0.004)  (0.004) 
Housing_deprivation  0.007  0.008 
 
-0.029**  -0.026* 
 
(0.012)  (0.012) 
 
(0.014)  (0.014) 
Crime_ deprivation  -0.007  -0.003 
 
-0.042***  -0.040*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
 
(0.011)  (0.011) 
Environment_deprivation  -0.004  -0.004 
 
0.048***  0.045*** 27 
 
 
(0.013)  (0.013) 
 
(0.015)  (0.014) 
Health_deprivation  -0.044*  -0.035 
 
-0.098***  -0.080*** 
 
(0.024)  (0.024) 
 
(0.024)  (0.023) 
Employment_deprivation  -0.038*  -0.042** 
 
-0.041**  -0.039** 
 
(0.021)  (0.021) 
 
(0.018)  (0.017) 
Density (persons per hectare)  -0.034***  -0.037*** 
 
-0.039***  -0.034*** 
 
(0.010)  (0.010) 
 
(0.011)  (0.011) 
Non-domestic buildings (square metres)  -0.001  -0.002 
 
0.001  0.006 
 
(0.009)  (0.009) 
 
(0.007)  (0.007) 
Regions 
          East Midlands  -0.488***  -0.464*** 
 
-0.594***  -0.602*** 
 
(0.092)  (0.091) 
 
(0.120)  (0.116) 
East England  -0.573***  -0.565*** 
 
-0.485***  -0.485*** 
 
(0.065)  (0.065) 
 
(0.127)  (0.123) 
North East  -0.860***  -0.851*** 
 
-0.821***  -0.820*** 
 
(0.062)  (0.064) 
 
(0.088)  (0.082) 
North West  -0.520***  -0.512*** 
 
-0.560***  -0.585*** 
 
(0.067)  (0.067) 
 
(0.084)  (0.078) 
South East  -0.253***  -0.245*** 
 
-0.364***  -0.368*** 
 
(0.060)  (0.060) 
 
(0.093)  (0.090) 
South West   -0.533***  -0.520*** 
 
-0.478***  -0.464*** 
 
(0.091)  (0.091) 
 
(0.079)  (0.074) 
West Midlands  -0.680***  -0.680*** 
 
-0.473***  -0.503*** 
 
(0.056)  (0.056) 
 
(0.081)  (0.083) 
Yorkshire  -0.610***  -0.633*** 
 
-0.731***  -0.742*** 
 
(0.078)  (0.072) 
 
(0.070)  (0.068) 
Local Authorities 
          Bath  -0.075  -0.080 
 
-0.161*  -0.182** 
 
(0.093)  (0.091) 
 
(0.086)  (0.085) 
Bexley  -0.336***  -0.331*** 
 
-0.422***  -0.426*** 
 
(0.058)  (0.058) 
 
(0.072)  (0.067) 
Blackpool  -0.329***  -0.343*** 
 
-0.193***  -0.163*** 
 
(0.053)  (0.053) 
 
(0.067)  (0.062) 
Bradford  -0.181**  -0.159** 
 
-0.066  -0.060 
 
(0.076)  (0.067) 
 
(0.055)  (0.052) 
Brent  0.028  0.024 
 
0.040  0.020 
 
(0.062)  (0.067) 
 
(0.096)  (0.096) 
Buckinghamshire  -0.421***  -0.427*** 
 
-0.093  -0.078 
 
(0.051)  (0.053) 
 
(0.079)  (0.075) 
Camden  0.685***  0.703*** 
 
0.598***  0.565*** 
 
(0.068)  (0.068) 
 
(0.071)  (0.070) 
Cheshire  -0.168**  -0.201** 
 
-0.248***  -0.234*** 
 
(0.082)  (0.081) 
 
(0.079)  (0.073) 
Coventry  -0.173***  -0.158*** 
 
-0.300***  -0.281*** 
 
(0.043)  (0.043) 
 
(0.066)  (0.070) 
Darlington  0.202**  0.188* 
 
0.187  0.177 
 
(0.102)  (0.099) 
 
(0.170)  (0.153) 
Derby  -0.446***  -0.469*** 
 
-0.342***  -0.344*** 
 
(0.085)  (0.083) 
 
(0.116)  (0.113) 
Enfield  -0.114*  -0.098 
 
-0.105  -0.134** 
 
(0.069)  (0.070) 
 
(0.065)  (0.061) 
Gloucestershire  -0.168*  -0.166* 
 
-0.084  -0.103 
 
(0.097)  (0.097) 
 
(0.092)  (0.091) 28 
 
Greenwich  -0.109  -0.092 
 
0.097  0.095 
 
(0.067)  (0.068) 
 
(0.101)  (0.101) 
Hampshire  -0.388***  -0.440*** 
 
-0.253***  -0.264*** 
 
(0.057)  (0.065) 
 
(0.085)  (0.080) 
Havering  -0.385***  -0.396*** 
 
-0.349***  -0.386*** 
 
(0.057)  (0.057) 
 
(0.077)  (0.075) 
Islington  0.731***  0.739*** 
 
0.718***  0.711*** 
 
(0.066)  (0.068) 
 
(0.082)  (0.080) 
Kirklees  -0.288***  -0.258*** 
 
-0.141*  -0.152* 
 
(0.079)  (0.069) 
 
(0.079)  (0.080) 
Lambeth  0.455***  0.449*** 
 
0.420***  0.400*** 
 
(0.071)  (0.070) 
 
(0.080)  (0.078) 
Lancashire  -0.301***  -0.325*** 
 
-0.370***  -0.363*** 
 
(0.071)  (0.071) 
 
(0.071)  (0.067) 
Leeds  -0.283***  -0.269*** 
 
-0.163***  -0.170*** 
 
(0.088)  (0.081) 
 
(0.049)  (0.048) 
Newham  -0.029  -0.026 
 
0.074  0.016 
 
(0.057)  (0.057) 
 
(0.072)  (0.070) 
Norfolk  -0.298***  -0.303*** 
 
-0.393***  -0.402*** 
 
(0.055)  (0.055) 
 
(0.111)  (0.109) 
Northtyneside  0.030  0.010 
 
0.057  0.029 
 
(0.052)  (0.052) 
 
(0.054)  (0.052) 
Northyorkshire  -0.182**  -0.159** 
 
-0.070  -0.056 
 
(0.072)  (0.065) 
 
(0.063)  (0.063) 
Northamptonshire  -0.426***  -0.443*** 
 
-0.322***  -0.345*** 
 
(0.088)  (0.084) 
 
(0.107)  (0.105) 
Reading  -0.217***  -0.233*** 
 
-0.024  -0.016 
 
(0.056)  (0.055) 
 
(0.094)  (0.087) 
Richmond  0.222***  0.240*** 
 
-0.122  -0.130 
 
(0.075)  (0.076) 
 
(0.086)  (0.082) 
Salford  -0.111  -0.121* 
 
0.065  0.060 
 
(0.072)  (0.070) 
 
(0.091)  (0.089) 
Solihull  -0.018  -0.016 
 
-0.170**  -0.181** 
 
(0.071)  (0.072) 
 
(0.075)  (0.076) 
Somerset  -0.195**  -0.196** 
 
-0.218***  -0.227*** 
 
(0.086)  (0.085) 
 
(0.069)  (0.065) 
Southampton  -0.430***  -0.424*** 
 
-0.232***  -0.235*** 
 
(0.045)  (0.045) 
 
(0.079)  (0.074) 
Southend  0.054  0.063 
 
-0.060  -0.089 
 
(0.051)  (0.050) 
 
(0.104)  (0.104) 
Staffordshire  -0.201***  -0.208*** 
 
-0.415***  -0.405*** 
 
(0.055)  (0.055) 
 
(0.072)  (0.075) 
Stockport  -0.156***  -0.159*** 
 
-0.052  -0.066 
 
(0.058)  (0.057) 
 
(0.074)  (0.067) 
Stockton  -0.035  -0.039 
 
-0.096  -0.095 
 
(0.058)  (0.059) 
 
(0.061)  (0.060) 
Sutton  -0.264***  -0.236*** 
 
-0.396***  -0.427*** 
 
(0.058)  (0.059) 
 
(0.071)  (0.069) 
Swindon  -0.319***  -0.316*** 
 
-0.331***  -0.354*** 
 
(0.085)  (0.085) 
 
(0.076)  (0.072) 
Trafford  0.080  0.072 
 
0.036  0.057 
 
(0.064)  (0.064) 
 
(0.077)  (0.073) 
Wigan  -0.317***  -0.327*** 
 
-0.263***  -0.271*** 29 
 
 
(0.073)  (0.072) 
 
(0.066)  (0.061) 
Wiltshire  -0.103  -0.092 
 
-0.263***  -0.297*** 
 
(0.094)  (0.093) 
 
(0.073)  (0.073) 
Wokingham  -0.270***  -0.270*** 
 
-0.252***  -0.240*** 
 
(0.053)  (0.052) 
 
(0.079)  (0.077) 
Constant  12.070***  12.059*** 
 
12.018***  12.041*** 
 
(0.064)  (0.064) 
 
(0.084)  (0.079) 
            N  1385  1385 
 
1209  1209 
R2  0.851  0.852     0.837  0.840 
Notes: neighbourhood characteristics were standardized; reference Region is London and reference Local Authorities are: Barnet, Rutland, 
Bristol, Essex, York, Manchester, Birmingham, Surrey, and Newcastle (one from each Region); standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and the symbols *, ** and   *** denote statistical significance at 10%,5% and 1%. 